

Learning From Broken Rules: Individualism, Bureaucracy, and Ethics

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The authors discuss findings from a qualitative research project concerning applied ethics that was undertaken at a general family counseling agency in southern Ontario. Interview data suggested that workers need to dialogue about ethical dilemmas, but that such dialogue demands a high level of risk taking that feels unsafe in the organization. This finding led the researchers to examine their own sense of "breaking rules" by suggesting an intersubjective view of ethics that requires a "safe space" for ethical dialogue. The authors critique the individualistic tendency of professional ethics as an effect of power that is tied to the history of professionalism, and discuss the role of bureaucracies in diminishing a central role for ethics in helping services. The authors call for elaboration of critical perspectives on ethics in order to promote the centrality of ethics in the helping professions.

Key words: applied ethics, counseling bureaucracies

Over the past three years, we have been investigating applied ethics in human service organizations. This article will describe research undertaken in the context of a general family counseling agency in Southern Ontario. The process and the results of the project have informed our growing awareness that mainstream conceptions of ethics function with certain guarantees of immunity in relation to questions of power. Our findings point to unarticulated norms concerning conventional conceptions of ethics and organizational structures that lead us to explore an

intersubjective perspective of professional ethics. Our article will work toward a critical perspective on ethics by calling into question the individualistic prescriptions for ethics found in mainstream professional ethics literature, as well as the bureaucratic organizational structure of human service organizations in which ethical decision making frequently takes place.

Our approach to applied ethics included our desire to challenge conventional conceptions of professional ethics. As former practitioners, we began the research with assumptions about conventional ethics as rule bound, distant, and prescriptive (Brown, 1997). Further, we made an assumption that such conventions had a deterrent effect on the centrality of ethical discourse in mental health settings. We also believed that a central place for ethics in mental health settings ultimately protects consumers. This assumptive framework generated the desire to understand more about workers' lived experience of ethics.

THE RESEARCH FINDINGS

The research described in this article took place in a general family counseling agency in Southern Ontario. The agency is staffed primarily by social workers, and it operates from a very broad mandate of counseling and community services. The agency operates from a number of geographic locations within the area it serves. The research was organized as an investigation into the lived experience of ethics. A qualitative interview study was undertaken in order to understand the meaning and experience of ethics from participants' perspectives. We interviewed 10 participants, including 1 volunteer, 2 support staff, 1 participant from management, and 6 social workers at the agency. The interviews were based on three main question areas: workers' lived experience of ethics in the agency, workers' conceptions of ideal ethics, and workers' understanding of obstacles to ethics. Data were analyzed for thematic content, and interpretive accounts were developed and returned to the participants for verification and feedback.

During the interviews, participants described the multiple, complex, and difficult ethical dilemmas they face in their day-to-day practice with intensity and commitment. These dilemmas ranged across considerable territory: They discussed the limits of dual relationships in instances of a shared community between workers and clients, dilemmas of self-determination in cases with severely damaged clients, worker-parent relationships during treatment of children, the ethics of expert knowledge, responsibility for conflict over ethnic differences among staff, and intraagency conflict over different visions of appropriate therapies.

Workers' means of resolving such dilemmas usually took two forms. One was a "quick and dirty" informal consultation with a colleague. Here, the worker grabbed a trusted colleague at a free moment and talked about the case. These conversations were usually held in the interstices of the officially sanctioned allotments of time for appointments and meetings. The second route was to discuss

the case in supervision. Where the supervisor was perceived as trustworthy, this route was used as the formal space for ethical decision making. However, with budget cutbacks, formal time for clinical supervision was minimal. In general, workers described frustration with the marginality of ethics at the agency.

We asked workers about their conceptions of ideal ethics. Interview data pointed to a conception of ideal ethics as a particular process of dialogue rather than prescriptions or methods of applying rules. Indeed, many workers described explicit impatience with the rule-driven character of professional codes, and considered them useless or oppressive in actual day-to-day decision making processes.

It became clear to us that when workers encounter an ethical dilemma, they do not go into their office, shut the door, take the professional code of ethics off the shelf, and look up the best course of action. Instead, workers attempt to find a place to begin dialogue about the dilemma. They need to talk in order to develop the kind of knowing that allows them to make a decision. They need dialogue in order to facilitate this process. Such dialogue helps them consider what they might be overlooking, what they might not yet be fully aware of, or what questions they may be partially blinded from asking. Workers need to talk about doubts about certain courses of action, and about their personal feelings, some of which may be powerful and painful to expose. They need to test out possible outcomes in an atmosphere of respect and nonjudgmentalness. In other words, they need a process of coming to coherent consciousness about what they know, feel, experience, intuit, and believe in order to make an ethical decision. One worker called this process a "resolving conversation."

One of the primary difficulties with such a process orientation is that it requires the worker to be extremely vulnerable and to take risks. Resolving ethical dilemmas, perhaps more than any other kind of conversation in mental health organizations, requires contravening norms that construct the separation of private and public in the workplace. It requires one to speak openly and honestly about personal feelings and responses as part of one's professional obligation. As one worker put it, "to talk at deep levels about ethics is to talk about yourself as a person." Another expressed herself simply by saying "ethics threatens people."

The vulnerability experienced by workers when they attempt to engage in ethical dialogue creates the requirement for what workers called a safe space. A safe space means an atmosphere where uncertainty is tolerated as part of the process of coming to consciousness. It means nonjudgmentalness, respectful feedback processes, and an atmosphere where exposure of the self is welcomed. It requires an acceptance of emotion and intuition as acceptable forms of knowing.

This safe space, which is the condition for ideal ethics, did not exist for most of the participants in the study. Instead, workers described the perceived need to "cover your ass" in the organization. "Cover your ass" was the catchphrase that described the fear of exposure, and the fear of vulnerability that permeated the organization and jeopardized the centrality of ethical dialogue. Analysis of data pointed to several interacting factors that created the "cover your ass" mentality.

Political–Economic Climate

One issue was the impact of the current political–economic climate in social and health services in Canada. Most agencies and hospitals are under attack in the form of cutbacks, downsizing, and reorganization. In the agency under study, a serious restructuring exercise was taking place at the time of the study as a function of the agency’s deficit. In such a climate, it simply felt much more risky for workers to expose ethical dilemmas. The feeling of needing to hide oneself rather than engage in open dialogue came out of several interpenetrating dynamics that played out within the climate of fiscal fear.

Meaning of Professionalism

One part of this dynamic involved how the meaning of professionalism is deployed. The current political threat to social services seemed to influence a defensive and rigid definition of professionalism. Workers felt professionalism as a kind of pressure to be credible. A professional knows the right answers. A professional is certain; in other words, a professional is worth paying for. Professionalism as certain knowledge, however, is a contradiction to the creation of a safe space for ethical discussion. Within ethical dialogue, the professional must be free to be a learner, to be uncertain, and to be ambivalent. For workers to show this provision- alism in the current economic climate is to take the risk of feeling and being seen as unprofessional, as one who doesn’t really know what he or she is doing.

Power

Another part of the dynamic of constraint on safe spaces is organizational structure. As is normally the case, the agency is organized on a hierarchical basis. Line staff report to supervisors who report to management who report to the executive director who reports to the board. A contradiction exists when, in order to create dialogical ethical processes, the people with very little power have to expose what may feel like being “unprofessional”—that is, uncertain, ambivalent—to those who have more power in the organization. And again bearing in mind the larger economic realities, when organizations are being downsized, workers felt they could not afford to take the risk of ethics.

Decision Making

Another aspect of organizational structure workers talked about is the problem of “top-down management.” Here, workers felt frustrated and angry that their expertise and knowledge of clients’ needs had no impact on agency decision making. The agency seemed to be responding to the demands of funders, and workers’ professional decisions were pressured by “what the funders want.” Not having input

into the agency's decisions created a sense of helplessness and anger for some workers. This anger substantially influenced the organizational climate in the direction of distrust and cynicism. Such a climate militates against a safe space for ethics.

Accountability

An important deterrent to a safe space for ethics was the issue of accountability. Confusion and uncertainty about the nature of accountability for ethics existed in the agency. Does accountability mean that workers should be watched in case they make a mistake? Or does it mean facilitating an environment conducive to dialogue? The agency seemed to engage in both processes simultaneously, thereby producing the contradiction of asking for openness within the function of surveillance. The clearest way this problem showed up is in workers' fears that talking about an ethical dilemma with their supervisors would be converted to a "problem" that might show up on their personnel appraisal. Bear in mind that in the agency, supervision is the only formal forum for conversations about ethics. When workers are worried that such conversations will be used against them, they cease to bring ethical issues to supervision and there is no formal space for ethics. Workers' perception of the supervisor's responsibility to monitor performance precludes open ethical dialogue.

Time

Last, within this interplay of constraints on ethical dialogue, we want to talk about the material reality of time in regards to a safe space for ethics. Again, as these issues play out dynamically within the larger economic climate, the agency simply doesn't have time for ethics. Caseloads are large. Peer supervision is cut to once a month. Staff development time is cut. Ethics requires an investment of time that has been pushed to the margins as the agency tries to do more with less.

Summary. Workers view ideal ethics as dialogue about ethical dilemmas that is founded on engaging in what one worker called the "dignity of risk." The possibility of this process occurring depends on the safety of the organizational context, which, in turn, is vulnerable to the political and economic landscape. In lived experience, workers usually grab a colleague for a few minutes for a quick and not very public consultation, while looking over their shoulders for possible political ramifications.

REFLECTION ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS

These research findings were summarized in a preliminary research report which we gave to participants and then to management. Participants had some suggestions

for changes which we made, but they generally felt that the report reflected their concerns. We submitted the report to management. In a meeting to discuss the report, we learned that management saw the report not as a document that could generate action for encouraging the centrality of ethics at the agency, but as an interpretation that fostered their sense of discouragement and disempowerment. The participants' concerns about a safe space seemed to them to be a recirculation of old conflicts, with little new information that could affect ethics. Our interpretation of management's perspective was that we had failed to address ethics in any helpful way. Our own subjective response at this point in the process was concern and preoccupation with the shortcomings of the research process. We questioned our own research ethics around two particular points.

The Problem of Perspective

One of our major concerns was that there seemed to be a discrepancy between how management was depicted by implication in the report and the self-definition of management. We believe strongly that ethical research must attempt to understand people as the people they take themselves to be (Spelman, 1978). If research is to be empowering, people must be able to recognize themselves as fairly represented in the interpretation. By implication, the report created the possibility of interpreting management as insensitive to their use of power. Yet this implication did not match management's perception of themselves as "doing all they could." The view of workers was that power was an issue in ethics at the agency, and we felt an obligation to represent that view in the report. Yet how could we represent that point of view without recirculating entrapping divisions, divisions that may themselves be implicated in obstacles to a safe space? In other words, we worried that we reproduced disempowering conflicts.

Problem of Researchers as Outsiders

We believe in retrospect that we were unprepared for the degree to which the research was also an intervention. Such an intervention takes on the character of unwanted criticism from potentially poorly informed outsiders. Thus, we became quite concerned about the ethics of the research with regard to our status as outsiders in the agency. Initially, we did not know what to expect from the research interviews. When it became clear that ethics and organization was a primary theme, our status as outsiders became problematic. We questioned the meaning of informed consent, feeling that there had been no agreement to tread on such ground. Yet at the same time, we had questions about the meaning of outsiders in a publicly funded agency. Were we creating clumsy intrusions on the privacy of the organization, or

were we exercising both a democratic and academic imperative in commenting on important dimensions of service provision?

In hindsight, it is necessary for us to keep open these questions about research ethics. But it is also crucial to learn from our pervasive concern that we had betrayed the expectations of agency management to provide practical, expedient improvements to workers' ethics. In short, we felt we had violated unspoken rules which govern taken-for-granted meanings of ethics. These feelings were important signals that other layers of meaning needed to be explored, and they led us to the conclusion that our findings illuminated two aspects of ethics that are normally ideologically obscured from view. First, our findings suggest that intersubjectivity, contingent on democratic speech, is crucial to ethical decision making. This finding flies in the face of traditional conceptions of ethics as the private property of individuals. Second, our findings imply that the taken-for-granted structures of human service organizations are a deterrent to the democratic speech necessary for the enactment of an intersubjective conception of ethics. We felt that our research broke rules by calling attention to the damage done by the hierarchical relations and the paternalism of an "ordinary" organizational structure, and by promoting the possibility of democratic speech and intersubjectivity. Injunctions about naming hierarchy and paternalism are supported by the individualistic character of mainstream ethics which helps to restrain perceptions of need for dialogue.

ETHICS AND INDIVIDUALISM

As we perused the social work literature on professional ethics, we noticed the tendency of much of that literature to present ethics as a framework, usually laid out as a set of general principles that workers must think through in order to reach an ethical decision (Levy, 1993; Loewenberg & Dolgoff, 1992; Woody, 1990). There are many variations, but considerable agreement on the need for frameworks (Rhodes, 1986). However, this view of ethics locates ethics within individual moral actors with autonomous choices to make. The ideal practitioner or ethicist internally follows the principles of the framework until the conditions for an ethical decision are met.

We understand these frameworks as forms of individualism. An example can be seen in Loewenberg and Dolgoff's (1992) standard social work text entitled *Ethical Decisions for Social Work Practice*. The authors define professional ethics in the following terms: "Professional social work ethics are intended to help social workers recognize the morally correct way of practice and to learn how to decide and act correctly with regard to ethical aspects of any given professional situation" (p. 5). Here, we see a conception of autonomous workers as a kind of basic container awaiting the proper ethical filler that is to be provided by the authors. There is no suggestion of social dependence or of structural influences.

Lorraine Code (1991) describes such approaches as individualistic ontologies. "Rather than starting from a recognition of the existential primacy of social dependence, individualistic ontology and the moralities derivative from it take isolation and separation as the undisputed starting points of moral-political deliberation" (p. 80). Code suggests that "such theories concentrate so much on formal sameness in those stripped-down versions of 'selfhood,' that people—whether as bearers of rights or as rational, self-conscious agents—emerge as interchangeable units, anonymous beings who can rely on formal, simplistic, moral decision making procedures" (p. 80).

This conception of the individual moral actor is a cornerstone of the mainstream professional ethics literature. However, our data indicated that workers' experience of ethics is very different. Instead, workers clearly preferred an *intersubjective* process in which dialogue is used to reach an ethical decision. This intersubjective process consists of a worker's attempt to take the perspective of others involved in the dilemma by assessing the dilemma from their imagined perspectives. The worker's partner in dialogue assists in this process by contributing toward the identification of blind spots, suggesting alternative perspectives, and hearing and supporting the worker's feelings.

The family counseling agency workers called this intersubjective view of ethics "a safe space." They explicitly rejected individualistic frameworks where ethics is conceptualized as a monological application of rules. Indeed, as we searched our own memories of our experience as practitioners, we could not recall a single example of having used such frameworks in our own practices, nor could we recall our supervisors or other practitioners recommending them.

How can we explain the persistence of individualistic ontologies in the presence of such discrepant lived experience? Many writers have discussed individualism as an ideology necessary to capitalist patriarchy. Naomi Scheman (1981), for example, criticizes psychology's focus on the individual as an ideological function that hides from view the social and historical contingency of individuals: Individuals need "fixing" rather than social and historical relations of exploitation (Fox & Prilleltensky, 1997; Prilleltensky, 1994; Prilleltensky & Gonick, 1996). This view resonates with our data. Management, out of concern for agency accountability, was disappointed that we had not discovered a method of improving individual workers' capacities to deal with ethics. At the same time, the conflicts regarding the agency's ability to provide a safe space were attributed to individual traits like a chronic dissatisfaction, or insensitivity to power. The structural aspects of a safe space were hidden from view.

We can turn productively to Michel Foucault (1979, 1980, 1982) in order to speculate further on this question. Foucault described the "technologies" of individualization that are central to the exercise of modern power. At the heart of Foucault's argument is that the regulation of the individual—the production of "docile bodies" (Foucault, 1979, p. 135), is crucial to the capitalist modern state.

The helping professions are implicated in the exercise of power through power-knowledge relations. Power-knowledge relations work in the ordinary pathways of daily life to supervise, monitor, distribute, and classify individuals so that the normal and abnormal, sick and well, sane and insane are created in populations. Subjects of modern power introject these categories and come to normalize obedience. The exercise of power is achieved when individuals' wills are created in the interests of power, so that power ceases to be grounded in force or repression and is instead achieved through the conflation of normalcy and obedience. Places are prepared for subjects through the process of being scrutinized, marked, categorized, and corrected. Human service professionals are a key nexus for such preparation. But this means that professionals themselves are also effects of such operations of power. Professionals must be prepared for their place through the creation of the category *professional* as it constructs professional identity itself.

When we see the individualized technologies of ethics in the mainstream professional literature, it is necessary to raise questions about the function of that technology in creating the identities of professionals. Such identities are needed to warrant the position of professionals in the state. In the case of ethics, we have seen how the individualization of workers' moral reason instills a special knowledge, a special technology. This kind of special knowledge legitimizes the difference between professionals and clients. At the same time as helping to create the warrant for professionals, it renders the worker herself a site of correction. She can be improved, honed, and monitored for her adherence to special knowledge procedures. The individualism of mainstream ethics is disciplinary; it renders the professional an individual subject of correction and at the same time it creates the totalizing category of professional. Indeed, the connection between professionalism and ethics is explicitly made by Charles Levy (1993) when he says "The assumption of professional qualifications is a major premise of social work ethics" (p. 20).

While it is not the project of this article to provide a thorough deconstruction of individualism in mainstream ethics, we would like to signal the need to understand mainstream ethics as interpenetrated by technologies of modern power. While work on power in therapeutic relationships exists (Gartrell, 1994; Lerman & Porter, 1990), it is interesting to note that, to our knowledge, critical perspectives on the relationship between power and the forms of professional ethics do not exist in the literature. Our research challenges the ideological immunity of professional ethics from an examination of its operation within the dynamics of power.

It is quite interesting to see the effects of that immunity in both management's and researchers' responses to the report. Although we had been clear at the start of the research that we found mainstream ethics too distant and codified, none of us really grasped that these assumptions would mean examining the micropolitics of ethics. Management was genuinely and politely puzzled by what appeared to be the focus of the research on organizational matters rather than ethics. We were equally troubled by this apparent shift in the research. Such is the power of

individualistic conceptions of ethics, that an intersubjective view of ethics is difficult to recognize as ethics.

ETHICS AND ORGANIZATION

The second rule our research broke was to call “normal” agency structures into question. Linda Smircich (1983) notes that research in organizations can “generate information that may challenge the image held by organization members; it is not a neutral process” (p. 164). During the interview and feedback processes, participants tended to attribute the problems of a safe space to the *individual* nature of the organization—organizational “quirks.” Our research challenged the idea that these quirks are unique properties of the agency. Rather, we interpret “agency irritations,” as one worker expressed it, as patterns of domination endemic to the hierarchical and paternalistic nature of bureaucratic structure. This interpretation was a major rupture with a dimension of bureaucratic discourse which, according to Kathy Ferguson (1984) works to conceal processes of domination. “As [bureaucratic discourse] attempts to (and partially succeeds in) rendering its victims silent, it simultaneously disguises this effect in its claims to political neutrality” (p.16). Our research exposed workers’ feelings of being unsafe, of being unable to speak freely, of “covering their ass.”

This exposure raised questions about organizational structure which are rarely raised in human service bureaucracies, because of the strength of the disguise of neutrality. Our questions about the centrality of ethical dialogue in the agency drew attention to silenced aspects of the organization. And, “Once bureaucracy itself is seen as an *issue*, rather than as simply a fact of modern life or a neutral method of organizing activity, questions about it appear in a fundamentally different light” (Ferguson, 1984, p. 6). That different light illuminated dominating practices that curtailed ethical dialogue. Those practices include the isolation of workers and the antidemocratic forms of communication that lead to silence and resentment, rather than unconstrained discourse. Such practices were described by workers when they discussed “top-down management,” the function of the agency hierarchy, and the meaning of accountability. The effects of bureaucracy take place through hierarchy and micropolitics of paternalism. Andries Du Toit (1993) adds to our understanding of organization, communication, and ethics through his insights into paternalism in South African fruit and wine farms. His insights have been used by Susan Heald (in press) in her work on the paternalist university. While one dares not compare the situation for black South African workers with North American professionals, following Heald’s example, we can see the usefulness of Du Toit’s analysis to organizational contexts.

In general, paternalism means that the gaze of management is on the efficiency and productivity of workers. Management has the job of knowing the “whole

picture" and keeping the staff in line with the vision of the organization. Thus, responsibility for the organization is concentrated in management, and descends through the ranks with decreasing responsibility. This structure positions management as having the gaze from the top down, ensuring the role of "getting them to do the right thing." In such a way, the gaze of paternalism has the effect of constructing a desire to hide from view, thus constraining the requirement of ethics for an open transparent process. Paternalistic organizations, from an intersubjective frame, must therefore be suspect as to their capacity to foster ethics.

We cannot stress enough our conviction that it is necessary to understand the relationship between bureaucratic structures and speech. To do otherwise is to retreat into an individualism that trades views of workers as chronically dissatisfied, with views of management as insensitive to their use of power. Indeed, our learning from our discomfort with our first research report occurred because we felt that we inadvertently reproduced personalization in ways that felt harmful and disempowering. At that point, we had yet to understand the effects of structures. We were confused by the obvious personal integrity of agency personnel with the enactment of domination through bureaucratic structures.

The ideal ethics for which workers yearned—uninhibited dialogue—raises the question of the relationship between ethics and democratic organizational structures. Our data point to a pathway from bureaucracy, domination, and constrained speech to a marginalized place for ethics. In contrast, workers' ideal ethics implies a pathway from democratic organizational forms, mutuality, and unconstrained dialogue to the centrality of ethics in practice settings.

Such a pathway is described by Jürgen Habermas (1981, 1990, 1992). Habermas argues that just norms should be developed within a process of unconstrained speech by all persons affected by the norm in question (an "ideal speech situation"; Habermas, 1990, p. 85). Similarly, Simone Chambers (1995) tells us about norms of communication developed at the Seneca Peace Camp. The Seneca Peace Camp was an antiwar activist project based on collective, democratic organizational principles. Communication norms were based on responsibility to voice opinions, self-discipline in regards to resisting the need to get one's own way, respect, cooperation, and struggle. In other words, models of communication processes designed to make ethical decisions are based on an ideal of asserting one's own point of view without fear and taking the perspective of others seriously. If we make the shift from individual conceptions of the moral actor who follows prescribed rules to a conception of the moral actor who engages in intersubjective processes created through communication designed to make the best ethical decision, then the conditions for ethics must shift from the preoccupation with getting the worker to internalize the rules to developing processes of ethical communication.

This kind of process communication contrasts considerably with the need to "cover your ass" that workers described. Indeed, we have come to believe that promoting the centrality of ethics in human service organizations will depend on

shifting conceptions of ethics from individual-centered prescriptions to models of intersubjectivity that implicate the conditions in which intersubjectivity can take place.

CONCLUSION

Our learning in this research study has been achieved at the cost of dealing with the discomfort of breaking rules. Indeed, our guilt at finding ourselves “meddling” in the organization by naming processes that are usually enacted in organizational silence left us immobilized for several months after submitting the first report. However, intense reflection on our discomfort has led to our conviction concerning the need for a critical perspective on ethics.

The professional ethics literature has a way of excusing itself from the humdrum contamination of politics, ideology, and power. It is as if its own subject area of morality naturally repels the problem of power. Our research leads us to conclude that this immunity has stifled the growth of ethics as a central aspect of professional practice in ways that impoverish the human service practitioners and potentially harm consumers of service.

The individualistic mode of professional ethics that puts forward monologically applied schemes for ethical decision making is an effect of power. It proposes the isolation of workers at the same time that it produces norms of professionalism that separate workers from dialogue. It professes an ideal of a lone worker with specialized knowledge that warrants professional status.

Individualism dovetails with the demands of bureaucratic domination. The antipolitical stance of the bureaucracy requires silence. And silence is required in order to maintain the disguise of neutrality which obstructs resistance to domination. A central place for ethics cannot coexist with routines of surveillance and monitoring within hierarchical forms. This is not to suggest that there are easy alternatives ready at hand; the struggles with ethics in feminist service collectives attest to this problem. However, we need to raise questions about what kinds of organizational forms are more likely to create the possibility of a central place for ethics.

One participant said “ethics is like water—it’s everywhere.” This metaphor can profitably be extended to power, which is inseparable from ethics. When we attend to power and ethics, we can begin to envision ethical practices that can promote the centrality of ethics. We have mentioned the need to shift ethics to an intersubjective frame. Such a frame insists that we take account of ethics within the context of the possibility of democratic speech. It also suggests an ethics that, in contrast to the static systems of rules proposed in professional literature, is always under development within public processes. It is the public nature of such a process that can rescue ethics from its imprisonment on the same shelf as the codes of ethics. The public nature of intersubjective approaches may be an effective part of ethical accountability. But it is an ideal that forces us to locate ethics within the power

relations in which every ethical dilemma is embedded. This work will require us to develop critical perspectives on ethics.

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